Data Protection in Heterogeneous Distributed Systems: A Smart Meter Example by Kumari, P. et al.
Data Protection in Heterogeneous Distributed Systems:
A Smart Meter Example
Prachi Kumari, Florian Kelbert, Alexander Pretschner
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany
{kumari, kelbert, pretschner}@kit.edu
Abstract: Usage control is concerned with how data is used after access has been
granted. Enforcement mechanisms have been implemented for distributed systems
like web based social networks (WBSN) at various levels of abstraction. We extend
data usage control to heterogeneous distributed systems by implementing a policy en-
forcement mechanism for a smart meter connected to a WBSN. The idea is to provide
users an opportunity to share their energy usage and other related data within their
social group while maintaining control over further usage of that data. The implemen-
tation borrows from an existing usage control framework for a common web browser.
1 Introduction
Smart meters are energy (and gas and water consumption) monitoring tools, introduced
to record and display real time usage data with the goal to bring down both energy con-
sumption and the costs. By use of smart meters, users can track the amount of energy
(and its cost) utilized by different devices over different time points/spans in a day. Using
information provided by these smart meters, users can make better decisions regarding
the choice of buying devices or operating them at particular times [BHM+11]. Combined
with various data storage and interpretation tools, a smart meter can be transformed into an
energy information system. A well-known initiative in this direction is the Google Power-
meter [GP11, REU11]. We take this energy awareness initiative to the next step where the
user can not only see the different interpretations of his energy usage, but can also share
this data with his friends and others in his social network.
Connecting a smart meter to a WBSN provides interesting applications of energy usage
data. For example, it can show a user a comparison of his energy usage and related spend-
ing with that of his friends in a graphical form like an avatar (”his avatar is greener than
mine!”). Also, combining a popular and engaging application with energy management
would increase the frequency of user’s interactions with the energy information. The idea
is simple: let the technology integrate systems to help users conserve energy.
However, sharing energy usage data in a WBSN can raise serious privacy and data pro-
tection concerns [PRI11, TRU11, Pen11]. Smart meters collect far more information than
traditional meters: precise energy usage ranging from per second to per hour in a day.
Also, smart meters are envisaged to control the home appliances for monitoring and load
balancing, e.g., a smart meter can turn off a washing machine if the load is too high or the
energy is expensive during a particular time of day to restart it later. In sum, a smart meter
produces and can have access to much more information than mere readings. This means
that connecting a smart meter to the Internet and publishing all the data it has, can be
problematic for security, privacy, social, legal and political reasons. Many data protection
issues need to be addressed before such a system can be acceptable and become a norm;
e.g. ownership of data, purpose of data collection, persistence, processing and deletion
of collected data and so on. The challenge therefore is to design and build privacy-aware
applications that can control and protect all this data while enabling the user to enjoy all
the benefits of the smart meter - social network link. This is the goal of this work.
Relevant privacy issues are (1) misuse and theft of energy data from the profiles by other
WBSN users; and (2) the access, storage, processing and usage of energy data by the
WBSN and other related service providers. We have addressed the first set of issues in ear-
lier work: we presented a social network application SCUTA which generates and sends
usage control policies along with requested web page to the client side where the policy is
enforced at three levels of abstraction: the web browser, the windowing system and the op-
erating system [KPPK11,LP11]. In this paper we focus on the second set of privacy issues
which consider the WBSN and associated service providers as potentially malicious users
of data. To limit the scope, we consider the energy providers as well as the reading and
billing service providers as trusted. However, from a general data protection perspective,
they are not different from other service providers and there is no conceptual difference in
implementing data protection mechanisms at their end as well.
As a proof of concept, we implemented a prototype that connects a smart meter simulation
to SCUTA [SCU11]. Its interface is identical to a real smart metering system; we use a
simulation rather than the actual implementation because of the flexibility this provides in
“generating” energy consumptions. The prototype consists of policy enforcement points at
every location in the system except the smart meter and the meter reader’s domain (“energy
domain” in Figure 1). The prototype is work in progress.
Problem. The problem that we tackle is the enforcement of data protection requirements
in heterogeneous distributed systems; in particular, a smart meter connected to a WBSN.
We consider privacy concerns that are a consequence of storing energy usage data outside
the energy domain as well as sharing that data with other WBSN users who might misuse
it. The problem generalizes to data protection if multiple applications – in the domains of
both business and embedded IT – are connected to share data across different domains.
Solution. We introduce usage control mechanisms at every location outside the energy
domain. These mechanisms intercept every request to data access and allow the flow of
data only if a proof of existence of a similar mechanism at the other end is provided. A
second usage control mechanism is implemented in the WBSN system that takes care of
controlling misuse of the data when it is shared on the social network web page. This
is an instantiation of our previous work on the topic. Protection of data after it has been
downloaded by other users is not the subject of this paper; this is done in [LP11,KPPK11].
Contribution. Firstly, we propose an architecture for data protection in a heterogeneous
distributed system while maintaining control over further distribution and usage of data.
Secondly, by means of a prototype and security analysis, we provide insights into the
limitations and the assumptions and conditions under which a certain level of security
guarantees in such a heterogeneous distributed system can be provided.
Organization. §2 presents related work. §3 introduces one example use case our system
can handle and describes the prototype’s design. Section §4 presents a security analysis,
assumptions and limitations. The paper concludes with possible refinements in §5.
2 Related work
This paper addresses the enforcement of data protection policies in a heterogeneous dis-
tributed system. These policies can and must be enforced at different layers of abstrac-
tion in the system. Among others, this has, for various policy languages [Ian08, XRM04,
AHK+03, Ope08, ZPPPS04, HPB+08, DDLS95, W3C05], been done at the operating sys-
tem level [HP09], at the X11 level [PBH+09], for Java [DJLP09,IDC07], .NET [DJM+09]
and machine languages [ES99,YSD+09]; at the level of an enterprise service bus [GNC10,
NPD11]; for dedicated applications such as the Internet Explorer [EKK+07] or in the con-
text of digital rights management [Ado10,Mic10,PHS+08]. The reason for this variety of
enforcement mechanisms is that the data that has to be protected comes in different repre-
sentations: as network packets, as attributes in an object, as window content, etc. In prin-
ciple, all these representations eventually boil down to some representation in memory, but
it turns out to be more convenient and simpler to perform protection at higher levels of ab-
straction. In this paper, we use existing data usage control enforcement mechanisms from
previous work to enforce data protection policies in a heterogeneous [KPPK11, LP11].
Using smart meter data for creating awareness about energy consumption is not a new idea.
Two well-known initiatives in this direction are the Google Powermeter [GP11] and the
GE smart energy interface [GE11]. In Finland, the government has initiated projects com-
bining smart meters, social networks and cloud computing [Abe11, Fin11]. Ensuring that
multiple applications from different domains work together with adequate data protection
is a difficult task and although data protection for smart meters and grids has been the topic
of research [EK10,BSU10,JJK10,RD10], so far focus has been on securely collecting data
from the smart meters. To the best of our knowledge, there is no publicly available work
that enforces data protection policies for further usage of the collected data.
3 The Proposed Framework
To connect a smart meter to a WBSN, we extended the WBSN application SCUTA [SCU11]
to include a ‘smart energy’ component. If the user of the smart meter wants to share his
energy usage data on his WBSN profile, he needs to access this component provided on
his profile page. The smart energy system provides many interesting applications of smart
meter data, including: users can publish their absolute energy usage over a period of time;
users can share their overall energy usage in a visual format like an avatar which changes
face and color (red, yellow, green) according to energy usage; users can compare their
energy usage with that of others in their social group; users can see how energy usage
at different times of the day affects total costs and they can learn how they should move
their energy consumption patterns to minimize the costs; users can post ideas/suggestions
about the efficient usage of energy and share with all; users can get useful information and
advertisements customized according to their energy needs.
The remainder of this paper focuses on data protection in the system described above.
3.1 A Use Case
Consider a WBSN scenario where Alice shares her smart meter data with her social group.
Alice wants no other user to be able to copy and store her meter readings for further usage.
Alice also wants that third parties like the advertisement providers may only temporarily
store her readings and the valid purpose must only be to serve advertisements. In a usual
connection between a smart meter and WBSN, without a data protection mechanism, it is
not possible for Alice to achieve this desired level of control over her data. Later, we will
show how our solution helps Alice.
3.2 Requirements
We consider two attackers: the potentially malicious end users of WBSN and other ser-
vices as well as potentially malicious service providers. Thus we have two types of user
requirements for data protection. The first category concerns controlling the usage of data
downloaded and rendered at the end users’ machines. An example requirement is to in-
hibit copy, save, print and other actions on data. These requirements have been taken from
[KPPK11]. The second category relates to the collection, storage, further distribution and
usage of data at the service providers’ end. Requirements in this category include the fol-
lowing. The list is not complete; we quote a few interesting requirements to clarify the
kind of requirements we are interested in:
• Meter data should be collected by the WBSN every t seconds;
• At the WBSN server, meter data should be aggregated every N hours;
• Energy usage should be displayed without time, location and device information;
• Meter data should not be stored for more than three months, i.e. if data is older than
three months, delete it;
• All energy data should be deleted if the user deletes his profile at the WBSN;
• Whenever energy data flows out of the WBSN domain, the event should be logged;
• Third parties like advertisement service providers should only be able to process the
data for their stated purposes, they should not permanently store any energy data.
To enforce the aforementioned requirements in the distributed system, we introduce usage
control policy specification and enforcement points at several locations. In the following,
Figure 1: The Proposed Architecture
we present the proposed architecture of the prototype.
3.3 Design
Figure 1 shows the proposed architecture. Meter readings are forwarded to and stored in
the meter reader’s database for billing and other purposes. These entities are trusted; we
collectively call them the Energy Domain. The meter reader provides stored readings to
various data interpretation services to help users understand different semantics of their
energy usage. Data usage control policies are specified at the management console in the
smart meter system and the data provider component in the meter reader.
The Smart Meter Application handles collection, storage, processing and forwarding of
meter readings from the meter reader to WBSN and other third party service providers.
Data is sent out of the energy domain only in response to a request. Before sending data
outside its domain, the meter reader seeks proof of an existing usage control mechanism at
the requester’s end. Data is forwarded to the requester along with usage control policies.
To make sure that the policies are enforced at every location in the distributed system, the
following requirements must be implemented:
1. Data can be forwarded to another location only if a usage control mechanism is
present at the receiving end;
2. Policies can only be strengthened before being forwarded [PSSW09];
3. All policies received with data must be re-attached to the data before it leaves the
sender’s system.
We call the respective process conditional forwarding.
Thus, as data flows through various locations, checks for ensuring the existence and in-
tegrity of usage control mechanisms are done recursively throughout the complete system.
For example, before the Smart Meter Application forwards meter readings to be displayed
at the end user’s profile page, it performs a mechanism check for the WBSN Application
which in turn does a similar check if it forwards readings to a third-party like advertisement
provider for rendering advertisements on the user’s profile page.
Energy Domain Smart Meter System (SMS). This is the complete set of hardware and
software installed inside a smart meter user’s home. The user can control distribution
of meter readings by editing the default policies provided by the meter reader using the
Management Console.
To share energy usage data in the WBSN, the user must (a) register to use the ‘smart en-
ergy’ tool at the WBSN server and provide his smart meter ID; and (b) provide a digitally
signed confirmation about his agreement on releasing the data to the WBSN application.
The user can also specify policies that put constraints on the collection and further distri-
bution of energy data, e.g., the frequency of data collection, deletion of data after a certain
time period etc. These policies are specified using templates and they override the default
policies specified by the meter reader while releasing data to external service providers.
Meter Reader. This is the set of components responsible for meter reading services at the
energy provider’s end. Data Collector represents the logic and the connection between the
individual smart meters and the Readings Database. Permissions Manager takes care of
checking the authenticity of signed permissions. If the external service provider requests
meter readings by presenting the signed permission provided by the smart meter user,
the Data Provider queries the Permissions Manager and depending upon the response, it
forwards the meter readings along with policies to the requester, or denies the request.
Smart Meter Application (SMA) This component provides smart meter data storage
and interpretation services to the WBSN. These services can be provided by a third party
or can be a part of the WBSN application. That is why it is shown by dotted lines in
Figure 1.
SMA servers. The SMA provides a number of services like requesting/receiving meter
readings from the meter reader’s database, saving the readings to SMA database, process-
ing stored readings to generate avatars, graphs etc. and forwarding them (including raw
data) to the social network web server. All these functionalities are provided by the various
servers (Server-1 to N in Figure 1) via the smart meter application interface.
Connecting SMA to Meter Reader. Figures 2 and 3 show the steps that connect an SMA
to the Meter Reader. Alice registers with the smart energy component in the WBSN ap-
Figure 2: Registration Process
Figure 3: Connecting SMA to Meter Reader
plication. This component stores the details of registration in the SMA database. The
registration data is then used by the responsible SMA server to start fetch data from the
meter reader at regular intervals. Usage-controlled data is sent only after getting a confir-
mation about the existence and integrity of the requester. Details of this process are shown
in Figure 4. The sender’s policy enforcement and policy management component (PEMC)
intercepts the send event and asks the receiver to show a proof of usage control mecha-
nism (UCM) which is taken care of at the receiver’s end by the receiver’s PEMC [NHP11].
Consequently the sending process is aborted or continued by attaching a policy to the data
and forwarding them together to the receiver. If the receiver’s PEMC gets the data and
policy together, it detaches the policy from data and deploys it while forwarding the data
to the component that initiated the request for data at this end.
Other Third-party Applications Other third party applications (e.g., a service provid-
ing customized advertisements) get access to smart meter data through the WBSN appli-
cation which first requests readings from the smart meter application and then forwards
them to the third party service provider.
An Example Scenario. Figure 5 shows one example scenario where Bob accesses Alice’s
‘smart energy’ page at the WBSN. While the avatar shown at this page is generated using
Alice’s meter readings, advertisements are served using Bob’s energy consumption pat-
tern. This complete scenario shows how different components of the proposed framework
interact with each other and how the resulting data flow is controlled (note the bold dotted
lines representing the usage controlled data forwarding as per Figure 4).
Figure 4: Forwarding Usage Controlled Data
3.4 Revisiting the use case
In our example in §3.1, Alice wants no other user to be able to copy and store her me-
ter readings for further usage if she shares them on her WBSN profile. For this, she can
specify usage control policies in the SCUTA web interface. These policies are then en-
forced at the other users’ machines by the policy enforcement point BRUCE, as explained
in [KPPK11, LP11].
Alice also wants third parties like the advertisement providers to only temporarily store
her readings and that the only valid purpose is to serve advertisements. For this, she can
use our proposed system to edit the policy templates and specify policies at the man-
agement console of the smart meter system. This policy can be formally expressed in
OSL [HPB+08] as:
(Decl, {
(AdvertisementProvider, permitonlyevname({storeTemporary, process, serveAd}, {(object, readings)})),
(AdvertisementProvider, permitonlyparam({serveAd}, purpose, storeTemporary, {(object, readings)}))
})
Various policy enforcement and management components in our system ensure that this
policy is enforced throughout. One basic assumption is that the requirement of conditional
data forwarding (mentioned at the beginning of this section) is enforced every time there
is a request for meter readings.
While the policy is specified by Alice, the latter requirements are hard coded at the Data
Provider’s side. With conditional data forwarding, the policies are sent to the third party
advertisement provider via the WBSN application. Depending on the chosen implementa-
tion mechanism [MAS10], an attempt to permanently store readings inside the advertise-
ment provider’s infrastructure is inhibited, modified, or executed and logged.
Figure 5: An Example Scenario
4 Security analysis
Our proposed architecture guarantees that the user’s energy usage data is not redistributed
and reused in an uncontrolled way once it has been released by the meter reader. However,
certain assumptions must hold true for this.
Assumptions. One of our main assumptions is that all systems maintaining usage con-
trolled data are always online. Since we are working on making the enforcement mech-
anisms tamper-proof (see below), they will enforce usage control requirements while the
system is offline and potentially report usage control violations asynchronously once the
system goes online again.
We also assume that all network connections are secure. Assuming this, Man-in-the-
middle and similar attacks, whether active or passive, are not possible. Such secure con-
nections can be achieved using IPSec [KS05], tcpcrypt [BHH+10] or virtual private net-
works. TLS [DR08] is not an option, since we want our architecture to be as little intrusive
as possible and be independent of concrete applications and their support for TLS.
Moreover, we consider all the hardware and software used in our scenario to be free of
vulnerabilities. If some hardware, the underlying operating system or the enforcement
mechanisms are vulnerable, this could give an unexpected attack surface for any attacker
from the outside.
Policy Enforcement. To correctly enforce usage control policies, we need to make sure
that (a) policy specification and enforcement mechanisms exist and they are not circum-
vented or tampered with and (b) the implemented policies actually enforce the policy
specified by the end user. Securing such a usage control infrastructure can and has been
done [NPD11]; the remote attestation part is the subject of future work. In terms of check-
ing whether or not a policy is indeed enforced by a specific mechanism, formal techniques
have been developed earlier [PRSW09]. In sum, the components of the solution to this
problem exist but need to be integrated.
For the first case, we need to trust one particular component inside each system that makes
sure that all the other components that are built upon it are secure. Considering a computer
system where the user does not have root privileges, this component can be the operating
system. If the user has full access, even to the hardware, this problem boils down to the
usage of trusted computing hardware.
We plan to integrate the BonaFides system [NHP11], which we have developed in earlier
work, into our architecture. BonaFides tackles the problem of malicious system adminis-
trators in virtualized infrastructures and allows for trusted computing by measuring cru-
cial system files. These measurements are then sent to and checked by a trusted verifier
at regular time intervals. Since the systems of the WBSN and the third-party application
providers are most likely to be virtualized, BonaFides can help to make the enforcement
mechanisms secure.
Moreover, certificates signed by a certificate authority allow for the secure authentication
of data requesters. Using certificates, detective enforcement mechanisms at the WBSN,
the SMA and third-party applications may be sufficient, since the data provider already
knows the receiver through the certificate. The securely authenticated data requester may
then be held responsible whenever he uses usage controlled data in an unauthorized way.
Guarantees. Since we focus on privacy issues of a smart meter connected to a WBSN, our
main concern is about the end user Alice who registers for the smart energy tool provided
by the WBSN. While Alice wants to share her energy usage data and use additional third-
party services, she also wants to keep full control over all copies of her data by tracking,
and possibly constraining, the flow and usage of data throughout the overall architecture.
With our approach of recursively checking for usage control mechanisms, we achieve a
reliable data flow tracking across different systems and domains. Controlling the usage of
Alice’s data within each single system is then accomplished at the different layers of each
system [LP11], each layer implementing a PMEC.
Usage control policies can be enforced in both preventive and detective ways. End users
who visit Alice’s smart energy page, would prefer preventive usage control enforcement
than being spotted upon wrong usage of data and face penalties. Moreover, if a data
consumer proves the existence of preventive usage control mechanisms, there is not nec-
essarily the need for the data provider to know the identity of the data consumer.
On the other hand, WBSN, SMA, or third-party application providers would prefer to
prove the existence of detective enforcement mechanisms and additionally prove their
identity to the data provider using certificates. This is because these providers run com-
plex computer systems and because they do not want to lose control over their systems
by deploying a more restrictive preventive usage control mechanisms. Instead, detective
enforcement mechanisms can help the system administrators to comply with the policies,
e.g. by raising an alarm whenever a restricted usage is attempted and asking the admin-
istrator for a decision. Assuming that the identity of the data recipient has been correctly
proven before he gets usage controlled data, he may face penalties for illegal usages.
Our architecture focuses on controlling energy usage data. In addition, one would also like
to protect other sensitive data like meter IDs or users’ personal information. Moreover,
WBSN, SMA, and third-party application providers have a legitimate interest in getting
valid, authentic, and correct energy usage data in order to offer valuable and interesting
services. Although we do not consider these aspects in this paper, guarantees of that kind
can be provided using the same infrastructure that protects the energy usage data.
Attack scenarios. For the scope of this paper, we consider the scenarios in which WBSN,
SMA, or third-party application providers are malicious. The scenario where end user
Bob, who accesses Alice’s smart energy page, is malicious, is investigated in related and
ongoing work [KPPK11].
The SMA may ask the meter reader for the energy usage data of users who did not opt-
in for the smart energy tool. Clearly, the meter reader must not reveal energy usage data
upon such a request. Countermeasures can be implemented using pre-shared secrets and/or
certificates. Using certificates, the user could give a signed permission, that allows for the
collection of his energy usage data, to the SMA (via the WBSN). The validity of the
permission is then checked by the meter reader. Going one step further and assuming
that the SMA is outside the domain of the WBSN, an additional delegation mechanism
becomes necessary.
WBSN, SMA, and third-party applications providers may try to circumvent, switch off,
or tamper with the usage control mechanisms once the the usage controlled data has been
received. Therefore we need to make sure that usage controlled data cannot be accessed if
usage control mechanisms do not exist or if they are tampered with. This can be achieved
by encrypting the usage controlled data and assuring that only untampared usage control
mechanisms can decrypt the data. However, this is rather hard to achieve, since providers
will have full control over their systems including hardware access and administrative
permissions and may therefore circumvent the mechanisms just one level below. Therefore
we plan to integrate trusted computing mechanisms and the BonaFides system [NHP11]
in order to tackle this problem.
Since we consider the network connections between the different systems as secure and the
software as free of vulnerabilities, there is no (technical) attack surface for attackers from
the outside. Of course, an attacker could still break the system using social engineering,
phishing or faking certificates. However, we do not consider such attacks here.
Limitations. We do not consider the scenario in which Alice wants to change the policy
of some data that has already been released and distributed. This is because our architec-
ture does not provide mechanisms to attach policies to data that has already been released.
These issues are subject of ongoing work that we will incorporate into the proposed archi-
tecture later. Another crucial point is the integrity and authenticity of Alice’s data and the
results of processing this data. Our architecture does not deal with the problem of wrong
calculations on Alice’s data, e.g. if the SMA serves wrong or misleading avatars or energy
usage graphs, therefore violating the integrity of Alice’s data. Yet, such a behaviour would
result in a bad reputation of the service and user’s opting-out from the service.
For the energy domain, we did not performa a security analysis since we consider this part
of the proposed architecture as trusted. Whether the services inside the energy domain
(e.g. billing) can be trusted, and if not, what can be the requirements in that case, is the
subject of ongoing work [Pee11]. In this paper, we assume that the smart meter and the
meter reader must always be trusted by all stakeholders. If not, we believe that protecting
energy usage data within the energy domain is conceptually the same as what we have
presented in this work. As a starting point, we implemented traditional access control
mechanisms at the Data Collector in order to check whether a requesting component is
allowed to get the usage controlled data it has been asking for. Moreover, before releasing
energy usage data, the Data Collector requests for a proof of usage control mechanisms
and therefore kicks off the recursive check for usage control mechanisms.
Also, we do not look into security analysis at the end user’s system where the web page
containing sensitive usage controlled data is rendered in a web browser. This has already
been investigated in previous work [KPPK11].
5 Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we presented an architecture for enforcing data protection in a heterogeneous
distributed system comprising of a smart meter connected to a WBSN. Our initiative is
similar to Google Powermeter [GP11,REU11] except that (i) our solution is comparatively
easier to use as the smart meter end user need not upload his data, he only needs to give
his consent and can be oblivious of how the WBSN gets the data; and (ii) we enforce data
protection to prevent the abuse of this data by malicious entities.
We presented a framework that connects multiple applications to share data among them-
selves and enforces data protection policies in the resulting distributed system. We have
also performed a security analysis of our proposed framework and discussed limitations to
data protection in such a heterogeneous distributed system.
As a proof of concept, we have implemented a prototype in the context of connecting a
smart meter to a WBSN. By means of a use case, we explained the user requirements and
showed that our system (i) provides interfaces for the end user to express data protection
policies and (ii) enforces these policies both at the service providers infrastructure and the
end users’ machines.
This work is a first step towards the development of a full-fledged heterogeneous usage-
controlled system that brings together multiple applications like smart meters, video surveil-
lance systems, location-based services and social networks, etc. Such systems offer many
useful applications and open a new domain of research for application and data security.
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